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Abstract 
We use unique panel data on the evolution of transparent budget procedures in the American 
states over the past three decades to explore the political and economic determinants of fiscal 
transparency. Our case studies and quantitative analysis suggest that both politics and fiscal 
policy outcomes influence the level of transparency. More equal political competition and power 
sharing are associated with both greater levels of fiscal transparency and increases in fiscal 
transparency during the sample period. Political polarization and past fiscal conditions, in 
particular state government debt and budget imbalance, also appear to affect the level of 
transparency 
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1. Introduction  
From a policy perspective, government transparency has been an integral part of attempts 
to reform public sector governance since at least the early 1990s.  Broadly defined, government 
transparency is the overall degree to which citizens, the media, and financial markets can observe 
the government’s strategies, its actions, and the resulting outcomes. In this paper, we focus on 
one important aspect of transparency: fiscal (or budget) transparency. Fiscal transparency now 
plays a key role in public sector design; both the OECD and the IMF have recently implemented 
Codes of Best Practice for Fiscal Transparency to guide countries towards a more open fiscal 
policy decision process, partly in recognition of the fact that fiscal transparency does not always 
come about by itself. While it is sometimes possible for supranational institutions or higher-level 
governments to push for—or downright require—reforms of the budgetary process as a part of a 
stabilization package, the causes of government transparency during “budgetary peacetime” 
remain less well understood. 
In this paper we investigate, conceptually and empirically, the determinants of fiscal 
transparency. There exists a fairly large literature on the effects of institutions—both fiscal and 
political—but very little work considers the endogeneity of such institutions. Understanding the 
causes of institutional change is important for two reasons: First, it will help us to determine 
when we can reasonably expect institutions to emerge by themselves and when outside actors are 
needed for institutional change to take place. Second, it will enable us to estimate the effects of 
institutions on policy choices and outcomes. While institutions obviously do not change as 
frequently as does policy, the fact that institutional change is typically deliberate in itself makes 
it difficult to assess the direct impact of institutions on policy. The reason is that observed 
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changes in policy could be a function of past outcomes that also affect the scope and desire for 
institutional change, rather than a function of (changing) institutions per se. 
To investigate the causes of transparency, we have collected a unique data set on 
transparent budget practices in the American states from 1972 to 2002. This period saw 
substantial changes in the degree of fiscal transparency in state government budgeting.  Since we 
consider both a large number of cases and a measure with considerable variation, our analysis is 
an important improvement over existing studies of institutional change in budgetary procedures. 
The next section reviews the conceptual framework that guides our empirical analysis. 
Section 3 describes our panel data on transparency in the American states.  Section 4 offers a 
qualitative analysis of some interesting and important cases of reform. Section 5 describes the 
empirical specification for the quantitative analysis, section 6 reports the results, and section 7 
concludes and describes our next steps. 
2. Theoretical framework 
Institutions—fiscal or otherwise—set the stage on which political actors, voters, and 
markets interact. “Institutions affect behavior primarily by providing actors with greater or lesser 
degrees of certainty about the present and future behavior of other actors” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 
p. 939). The insight that institutions matter for choices and outcomes is the basis for the past two 
decades’ increased focus on principles of good governance, of which transparency of 
government is a prominent part. 
Increasing fiscal transparency is a way of providing voters, observers, financial markets, 
and sometimes politicians themselves with more information about the intentions behind fiscal 
policy, the actual actions taken, and the immediate and longer-term consequences of specific 
policies. This eases the task of forecasting future fiscal policy, and of attributing fiscal outcomes 
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to policies, and fiscal policies to particular politicians. A comprehensive definition of fiscal 
transparency is given by Kopits and Craig (1998, p.1): 
“Fiscal transparency is defined … as openness toward the public at 
large about government structure and functions, fiscal policy 
intentions, public sector accounts, and projections. It involves ready 
access to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable, and inter-
nationally comparable information on government activities … so that 
the electorate and financial markets can accurately assess the 
government’s financial position and the true costs and benefits of 
government activities, including their present and future economic 
and social implications.” 
 
There are literatures that analyze the consequences of transparency in government,1 international 
organizations, monetary policy, and fiscal policy, which is our focus in this paper. The next 
section reviews this literature, while the following section turns to the causes of transparency.   
Imperfect information and agency models 
Transparency is an issue only when there is imperfect information. In a simple sense, 
more transparency means “more information transmitted.” Many academics and policy-makers 
see more transparency as generally beneficial. The reasons, according to Posen (2002) include 
                                                 
1 Petrie (2003) provides thoughtful suggestions on how to make the implementation of transparency reform more 
effective. 
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trust,2 predictability,3 reduced noise in markets,4 credibility, and coordination.5 However, more 
transparency also trades off the value of sunlight with the danger of over-exposure, as Heald 
(2003) puts it. “Too much” transparency can produce excessive “politicization” and reduce 
flexibility. If information is revealed to third-parties who use it harmfully, increasing 
transparency can be bad.6 Finally, as Geraats (2002, 2005) points out, transparency can also 
affect incentives. For instance, if not keeping explicit promises is costly, transparency might lead 
politicians to keep promises when not doing so might be better. 
Several authors examine the effects of transparency in the context of imperfect 
information models. Milesi-Ferretti (2004) develops a reduced form model that allows him to 
investigate the interactive effects of transparency and fiscal rules, such as those imposed by 
members of the European Union under the Maastricht Treaty of the 1990s. He assumes that 
politicians are myopic (perhaps due to the positive probability of being replaced in the next 
election), and therefore prefer to run larger deficits than the public would like.  He finds that, in 
                                                 
2 Trust increases when transparency means “tell them what you’re going to do." If a politician has a history of 
having nothing to hide, then when he needs someone to take something on faith, he is more likely to get it. 
Transparency reassures people that he has not abandoned long-term goals, which could give him greater flexibility. 
3 Greater disclosure makes your actions more predictable when transparency means “give them details and 
justifications.”  
4 In the political market, voters get a clearer view of performance, and can make more effective use of votes. In 
financial markets, participants are not misled and risks are reduced (see Glennerster and Shin n.d.). Generally better 
observability is welfare-improving, as it reduces transaction costs in the broadest sense. 
5 Lowry and Alt (2001) provide such an interpretation of balanced budget rules, conditional on market behavior. In 
monetary policy, an incumbent wishing to be seen to fight inflation can do so more effectively if the standard for 
what will count as fighting inflation is unambiguous. 
6 In this way, “harmful” competition advantages secret voting (Dal Bo 2005). 
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this context, transparency affects politicians’ responses to fiscal rules: under high transparency, 
rules induce politicians to make the real fiscal adjustments needed to bring the budget into 
balance, while under low transparency such rules simply encourage “creative accounting.”  
In another line of inquiry, using the probabilistic voting model of Lindbeck and Weibull 
(1987), Gavazza and Lizzeri (2005) investigate the effect of transparency on competition among 
different groups of voters who value targeted transfers. Where competing parties engage in pre-
electoral competition, transparency on the expenditure side of the budget is welfare improving, 
while transparency solely on the revenue side can result in lower welfare as it reduces the 
marginal political costs of offering wasteful transfers. We return to this distinction in the 
empirical section by separately examining the causes of expenditure and revenue transparency.  
However, unlike these two papers, most work on transparency in political economics has 
taken place within a class of models known as political agency models, due to Barro (1973) and 
Ferejohn (1986). These models adapt the principal-agent framework, in which the agent is better 
informed than the principal, to a political setting such that voters, as principals, elect politicians 
who, as agents, make policy choices that affect voters. For an application to fiscal policy, see 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997).7 A direct focus on transparency, interpreted as the degree 
to which voters can observe characteristics of or actions taken by the agent, is not common, but 
we return to examples below.  
In a political agency model combining adverse selection and moral hazard, Besley (2005) 
and Besley and Smart (2003) show that increasing transparency has two countervailing effects 
                                                 
7 For a different asymmetric information model applied to fiscal policy, see Rogoff (1990). Geraats (2002) analyzes 
transparency in a signaling model where the incentive effects of transparency are sometimes set against the effects 
of inflation fighters’ reputations. 
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on voter welfare. On the one hand, increasing transparency allows voters to better screen good 
politicians from bad ones. On the other hand, greater transparency at the same time disciplines 
politicians in their rent-seeking, which makes it harder for voters to distinguish between good 
and bad politicians. The net result on the quality—and turnover—of incumbents is ambiguous. In 
Alt and Lassen (2006a), politicians do not seek rents for personal gain; rather, the politician’s 
concern for re-election is driven by a desire to implement policy. Therefore, the disciplining 
effect disappears and transparency unambiguously increases voter welfare through improved 
screening. 
Prat (2005) considers a distinction, introduced by Ferejohn (1999; see below), between 
the effects of transparency on consequences and actions.8 In Prat’s (2005) career concerns 
model, where both voters and the politician are uncertain about the politician’s type, improving 
the transparency of consequences is always beneficial to voters, but more information about the 
agent’s actions can be detrimental if it causes the agent to disregard private informative signals 
with an aim of appearing in a certain way to the public. The same idea motivates Morris and 
Shin’s (2000) treatment of transparency in monetary policy.  
Theoretical results on the effects of transparency on fiscal policy come from Shi and 
Svensson (2002), Besley and Prat (2006), Alt and Lassen (2006a,b), and Besley (2005). All 
model transparency within a political agency framework, where electoral promises are non-
enforceable and voting is retrospective. Voters hold incumbents accountable for their policy 
choices in the previous period, and transparency alleviates informational asymmetries between 
voters and politicians. The precise effects of transparency depend on the issue under 
consideration, but the main empirical conclusions of this literature are that increasing 
                                                 
8 See also Stavasage (2004) and Fox (2005). 
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transparency reduces debt accumulation and the scope for generating political budget cycles. A 
separate, empirical literature has investigated the effects of transparency on financial markets. 
Glennerster and Shin (n.d.) find that higher transparency lowers borrowing costs in sovereign 
debt markets, and Gelos and Wei (2005) find that emerging market funds invest less in less 
transparent countries. 
Models of endogenous transparency 
Although empirical studies have uncovered evidence that transparency has some welfare-
improving effects, the theoretical literature also suggests that the effects of transparency (and, 
therefore, for our purposes, perhaps the causes as well) are not always beneficial to voters. 
However, even if fiscal transparency were unambiguously desirable from the public’s point of 
view, it would still be the case, as noted by Alesina and Perotti (1996, p. 403), that “… 
politicians typically do not have an incentive to adopt the most transparent practices,” since 
doing so decreases their informational advantage over markets and voters—an advantage useful 
for political and re-election purposes. Why might politicians dislike transparency? As suggested 
in the foregoing discussion of the literature, there are many possible reasons: rent-seeking 
politicians do not wish to be disciplined; bad politicians do not wish to be distinguished from 
good politicians; re-election-minded politicians want to generate political business cycles; 
myopic politicians want to run bigger deficits than the public would like. For politicians, these 
factors militate against increasing transparency, and might even motivate decreasing 
transparency. 
Although politicians may not have incentives to increase transparency, it nevertheless 
does sometimes happen, even in the absence of outside pressure. Thus, the question arises: under 
what circumstances will politicians implement more transparent budget procedures? We explore 
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two broad sets of explanatory factors: the political setting and the fiscal environment. We look as 
well at the interaction between the two, since different factors can pull in different directions and 
institutional change can depend on which dominates at a particular time. We look first in some 
detail at the political setting, and then turn to the fiscal environment. 
Political setting 
The political setting can influence the demand—or lack thereof—for fiscal transparency 
in a number of ways. First, there are what we call partisan changes in transparency. These occur 
when incumbent politicians change the degree of transparency in order to further a specific 
partisan goal, such as an increase or decrease in the size of the public sector. Then there are non-
partisan changes, which can arise for a number of different reasons. Sometimes non-partisan 
changes take place when pressure for reform arises from within the bureaucracy.  They can also 
reflect attempts to accommodate financial markets, or in a broader context, supranational 
institutions. Most importantly for our analysis, non-partisan changes can arise when the political 
context, described by levels of political competition and polarization, provides current politicians 
with incentives to change transparency, independent of their partisan goals. An important feature 
of these political but non-partisan goals is the desire of some set of politicians to tie other 
politicians’ hands—whether the others are potential successors or other incumbents 
contemporaneously sharing power. In summary, we use “non-partisan” to indicate behavior that 
might be partisan but would be equally likely under either party.  
In the theoretical literature described above, the degree of transparency is given as a 
parameter determined outside of the model, before the economic and political choices of interest 
are taken. Only one contribution known to us (Ferejohn 1999) explicitly considers the 
“constitutional choice” of an information structure. Ferejohn introduces into a political agency 
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model the degree of transparency, modelled as the precision of a signal of the incumbent’s 
action, which is chosen by the incumbent before a typical period begins. In his model, voters—as 
principals—will, under certain parameter restrictions, allocate a larger part of their resources to 
the agent—the public sector—when they receive a more precise signal of the political agent’s 
action.  
Ferejohn’s model implies that politicians who wish to increase the size of the public 
sector should increase transparency so as to make voters trust them with more resources. 
Evidence that, in the American states, Democrats’ preferred level of spending is greater than that 
of Republicans (Alt and Lowry 2000) suggests that partisan changes in transparency will be 
driven by Democratic incumbents hoping to increase the size of government.  
An alternative, non-partisan view of the constitutional choice of transparency is based on 
the logic of strategic institutional design. Alt and Lassen (2006a) argue that transparency reform 
is closely analogous to delegation to an independent judiciary. Consider Hanssen’s (2004) 
delegation model, in which two parties compete for office and the incumbent faces an exogenous 
risk of replacement by the opposing party. The incumbent can choose to delegate policy choice 
to an independent institution, the judiciary. By doing so, the incumbent risks the possibility that 
the judiciary will make a decision that will favor the opponent; however, if the risk of 
replacement—and with it the risk of an adverse policy choice—is sufficiently large, the latter 
consideration outweighs the former and the politician will favor delegation.  
Similarly, an incumbent who is considering maintaining a low-transparency regime 
trades off the probability of remaining in office and enjoying the informational advantages 
afforded by low transparency against the risk of being replaced by an opponent who, if elected, 
would use a low transparency regime to pursue his own, opposing political goals. If the 
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incumbent instead chooses high transparency at the constitutional stage, he ties his own hands, 
but also those of his potential successor. If the probability of being replaced is large, the expected 
benefits of restricting the opponent outweigh the costs of restricting himself, whereas if he is 
likely to be re-elected, the expected benefits from increasing transparency are small. Thus, our 
testable hypothesis is that the level of fiscal transparency increases with political competition.9 
As discussed below, we measure competition in a variety of ways. 
Incumbents might want to tie the hands of not only their potential successors but also 
other politicians with whom they contemporaneously share policy-making authority.  Indeed, 
power-sharing among incumbents simply reflects another variety of political competition.  This 
form of competition is clearly more palpable under divided government (in which different 
parties control different branches of government) than under unified government (where the 
same party controls both branches).  Therefore, one might expect to see increases in transparency 
where divided government is more common. 
In addition to the probability of being replaced by (or the need to share power with) the 
opposing party, the degree of political polarization can also affect the trade-off politicians face in 
choosing the level of transparency. This can work in two directions. First, following from 
Hanssen, increased political polarization can raise the cost of being replaced by the other party, if 
it means that opponents in low transparency environments will choose policies that incumbent 
politicians particularly dislike. This suggests that polarization increases the benefits of tying the 
hands of a partisan adversary. Second, and alternatively, it could be the case that some sort of 
                                                 
9 Alt and Lassen (2006a) find support for this hypothesis in a cross-section of advanced OECD economies for the 
1990s. They use this, and a measure of legal origin (common vs. civil law), to instrument for transparency in an 
analysis of the effects of transparency on government debt. 
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agreement is needed in order for reform to take place. This possibility is reflected in the 
hypothesis of North (1990, p.191) that “political institutions constitute ex ante agreements over 
cooperation among politicians.” If this is true, a more polarized polity could be a hindrance, 
rather than a catalyst, to transparency. We will examine this issue empirically. 
Fiscal environment 
Along with political factors, fiscal policy outcomes can also influence politicians’ 
incentives to implement more transparency in the budgeting process. Historically, fiscal 
institutions often have been implemented or reformed following periods of fiscal distress.10 In 
particular, if a lack of transparency in the budget process contributed to a negative fiscal shock, 
an appropriate response would be to increase transparency. In New Zealand, wide-ranging fiscal 
reform was implemented in the 1990s when a new incumbent took office and found a big 
undisclosed fiscal obligation (Campos and Pradhan 1999). Substantial stabilization packages, 
and in some cases bail-outs, are often accompanied by reforms, either as required by outsiders or 
as a consequence of political turnover. Such reforms are not in the political interest of the 
incumbent(s) responsible for the negative shocks if they help voters attribute the bad outcomes to 
them. On the other hand, to the extent that transparency leads voters to attribute a newly 
improved fiscal situation to current politicians, it may be optimal for politicians expecting good 
fiscal records to increase transparency. There is a trade-off here between the incumbent’s fear 
that voters will punish him for the crisis and the desire to get credit for shaping up, even at a cost 
of other foregone opportunities.   
                                                 
10 For example, the introduction of balanced budget rules in the 19th century took place as a result of fiscal crises 
following from the construction of canals (Heckelman et al 1999). 
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3. Transparency Index  
Our transparency measure for state government budget procedures is based on Alt, 
Lassen and Skilling (2002). Using cross-sectional data for the 1990s from the National 
Association of State Budget Officers and the National Conference of State Legislatures, the 
authors code nine dichotomous budget procedures and create an index equal to the number of 
items for which each state had the more transparent procedure.11 The nine items are:   
1. Is the budget reported on a GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) basis?  
(Yes = more transparent, since shared language facilitates communication) 
2. Are multi-year expenditure forecasts prepared?  (Yes = more transparent, since more 
information about plans and the expected consequences of action is disseminated) 
3. What is the frequency of the budget cycle?  (Annual = more transparent than biennial, 
since more frequent action means more up-to-date information) 
4. Are the revenue forecasts binding?  (Yes = more transparent, since binding estimates 
increase the costliness of being misleading) 
5. Does the legislative branch have (or share) responsibility for the revenue forecast?  
(Yes = more transparent, since legislative or consensus forecasts involve more 
officials, reducing the likelihood that estimates are misleading or manipulative) 
6. Are all appropriations included in a single bill?  (Yes = more transparent, since a 
single location facilitates monitoring) 
7. Does a nonpartisan staff write appropriations bills?  (Yes = more transparent, because 
these staff have less partisan incentive to be misleading) 
                                                 
11 Alt and Lassen (2006a) presents a transparency index based on similar principles for nineteen OECD countries.  
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8. Is the legislature prohibited from passing open-ended appropriations?  (Yes = more 
transparent, because published figures will be closer to ultimate outcomes) 
9. Does the budget require published performance measures?  (Yes = more transparent, 
because these create more explicit standards and information for judging politicians’ 
actions) 
In this study, we extend the data back in time in order to construct a panel on budget 
transparency. We have collected a unique data set, comprised of survey responses to a 
questionnaire sent to the budget officers of all fifty states, to construct an annual score for each 
year between 1972 and 2002. We focus on the 48 contiguous states for the period 1976-1999 
(due to the inclusion of four year lags, see below), in total 1152 cases. We could not reconstruct 
the nine-item scale for all states in all years: 176 of the 1152 cases (15.3%) are missing one data 
item, 59 cases (5.1 %) are missing two items, and 12 cases (1.0 %) are missing three items. No 
case is missing more than three items. We code our transparency variable (“pctscore”) as the 
ratio of items scored = 1 to total items answered. Figure 1 shows the histogram for our 1152 
cases. The distribution is unimodal, with a median of 0.444 (4/9).  
[Figure 1 here] 
In some cases, a change in the transparency index reflects a change in the number of 
reported items, rather than an actual change. This would be the case, for example, if the 
respondent did not know the status for a particular year for a particular item. Excluding such 
cases does not change the impression of Figure 1 and, further, the statistical results presented 
below also are unaffected by such missing data. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of transparency in the fifty states from 1972 to 2002. Most 
states saw some changes in the degree of fiscal transparency (on the vertical axis) over the three 
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decades (horizontal axis). Some states saw quite substantial increases in transparency, some of 
which we will investigate in case studies, while seven states did not change their degree of 
transparency at all during the period. Overall, budget transparency increased from a cross-state 
average of 0.41 in 1972 to 0.54 in 2002. There was essentially no change in annual average 
scores until the early 1980s, when an upward trend began and later intensified during the 1990s. 
[Figure 2 here] 
4. Four Cases of Reform 
Four states made significant progress toward increasing transparency within a relatively 
short time frame. Specifically, these states’ scores on our nine-point transparency index 
increased by at least three points over a period of five years or less. The states—and the periods 
during which their reform bursts took place—are Delaware (1978-1980), North Carolina (1991-
1995), Rhode Island (1990-1991), and Wyoming (1993-1997). This section explores the political 
and economic circumstances surrounding these states’ reforms. 
Delaware 
Delaware was among the states hit hardest by the national recession of 1973-1975.  By 
January 1977, when Republican Governor Pete du Pont took office, its unemployment rate had 
reached an all-time high of 8.2 percent and the state’s finances were in a shambles (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2005). Du Pont’s election followed a period of unusually high party turnover in 
the governor’s office, compared to the state’s historic tendency to elect Republican governors. 
Both chambers of the legislature were newly under Democratic control, having been controlled 
by the Republican party during the previous decade, and by Democrats during the decade before 
that.   
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In 1977, the state was trying to recover from two previous administrations that 
had brought it to the brink of fiscal disaster. When Governor Pete du Pont found 
resistance to efforts at change, he decided to throw a serious scare into the 
legislature, the rating agencies and the citizenry by telling everyone that as far as 
he was concerned, Delaware was virtually bankrupt (Governing 2005).  
 
That year, Governor du Pont issued an executive order calling for the creation of Delaware's 
Economic and Financial Advisory Council (DEFAC), an independent, nonpartisan group of 
public and private sector experts charged with forecasting revenues. Since its inception, 
DEFAC’s revenue forecasts have been accepted without question by both the executive and 
legislative branches, and the council has been widely credited with helping Delaware to weather 
subsequent recessions better than many other states. Many observers, including State Treasurer 
Jack Markell, attribute DEFAC’s continuing success to the memory of the fiscal crisis: “It helps 
a lot that the state went through what it went through 30 years ago” (Governing 2005). 
North Carolina 
At the time of North Carolina’s 1990-1991 budget crisis, Republican James Martin had 
just been re-elected governor by a state that had, up until that point, almost always elected 
Democratic governors; the legislature, however, was firmly controlled by the Democratic Party, 
as it had been for many decades.  
In 1991, North Carolina’s fiscal problems grew to a crisis level. The state began 
the year with a $222 million General Fund balance and ended it with $400,000. 
To address its severe fiscal crisis, the General Assembly was forced to reduce and 
restrict hiring and operating expenditures, defer capital projects, draw down 
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reserves, reduce non-recurring expenses, increase taxes by $637 million, [and] cut 
expenditures by $576 million (GPAC 1992). 
 
“As a consequence of fiscal pressures,” the Democratic legislature in 1991 commissioned the 
newly-created Government Performance Audit Committee (GPAC) to conduct a year-long 
performance audit to identify ways to “reduce the costs of program service delivery and… 
strengthen the financial planning, budgeting, and management systems” (GPAC 1992). The 
Committee—consisting of the leadership and select members of the House and Senate, the State 
Auditor, and several private sector leaders—together with accounting firm KPMG Peat Marwick 
made several recommendations to the government of North Carolina (among them performance 
budgeting) which were subsequently implemented by the government.   
Rhode Island 
In the early 1990s, Rhode Island was, like North Carolina, in the midst of a major fiscal 
crisis.  The state was experiencing its largest deficit since the Great Depression, as well as the 
biggest government scandal in the state’s history: the failure of Rhode Island Share and Deposit 
Indemnity Corporation (RISDIC), the organization that insured the state. The governor at the 
time—Edward DiPrete—was the first Republican elected to that office in nearly two decades. 
Diprete was unpopular; at one point his job approval rating dipped as low as 16 percent (and 
after leaving office he was indicted for extortion and accepting bribes). Among other things, 
DiPrete was widely blamed for a budget process that was “political and inefficient,” according to 
Gary Sasse of the Rhode Island Public Expenditure Council, the state’s most prominent 
watchdog group. The legislature at the time was, as usual, controlled by Democrats. A 
Democratic legislator named Paul Crowley successfully introduced legislation proposing binding 
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consensus revenue forecasting.  The forecasting process is widely believed to have improved 
dramatically since then—it is less political and produces more realistic revenue forecasts, 
according to Mr. Sasse.12
Wyoming 
While Wyoming’s legislature has long been a Republican stronghold, the state has seen 
frequent party turnover in the governor’s office over the past fifty years. At the time of the 1990-
1991 recession and fiscal crisis, the governor was Democrat Mike Sullivan.  In the wake of the 
crisis, a bipartisan, inter-branch consensus emerged that the state needed to reevaluate and 
improve its budget process, according to Fiscal Administrator Mike McVay.  In 1994, 
Republican legislator and gubernatorial hopeful Jim Geringer submitted legislation calling for a 
new system that would use performance measures to link public spending to outcomes.  Geringer 
went on to win the governorship, returning the state to unified Republican control in 1995.  As 
governor, he oversaw the implementation of performance budgeting and continued to be a strong 
advocate of the new approach, despite growing resistance from the legislature.  According to a 
legislative source who wished to remain anonymous, “the legislature has basically said ‘we’re 
not having any part of this.’  They want an appropriations process that focuses on the nuts and 
bolts of spending, down to the number of paper clips”—that is, the line-item format with which 
they had grown familiar.  Mr. McVay concedes that the state, under the new administration of 
Democratic Governor Dave Freudenthal, is still “fine-tuning” the process. 
 
                                                 
12 Around the same time, Rhode Island took many other steps to open up the legislative process to public scrutiny.  
For a summary of these reforms, see http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/studteaguide/RhodeIslandHistory/chapt9.html 
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In summary, several common themes emerge from these states’ experiences: in all four 
cases, measures to increase transparency were adopted in response to recession-induced fiscal 
crises, during periods of divided government, following periods of high party turnover in the 
governor’s office.  Interestingly, legislative turnover was virtually nonexistent in three of the 
four states.  In some cases, the new measures seemed to reflect a consensus among policy-
makers, while in other cases one party or branch of government – not necessarily the same one in 
each case – clearly imposed reforms on the other. In the next section, we turn from qualitative to 
quantitative analysis in order to investigate the political and economic determinants of 
transparency in the full sample of American states.   
5. Empirical Methodology 
Our dependent variable is the transparency index summarized in Section 3.  As 
mentioned above, one of our main explanatory variables is political competition. A cursory look 
at the literature suggests that there exists no single agreed-upon measure of political competition. 
Therefore, in our empirical analysis, we utilize three different measures: (1) divided government, 
which is a dichotomous variable equal to one if different parties control the executive and 
legislature and zero otherwise;13 (2) gubernatorial competition, as measured by the share of 
Democratic votes in the gubernatorial election, folded such that the index captures absolute 
deviations from one half; and (3) legislative competition, as measured by Besley and Case 
(2003) as the (folded) Democratic seat shares in the upper and lower houses.14
                                                 
13 If control of the legislature is split between parties, we code the case as divided government. We return to this in 
table 5, below. 
14 It is defined as -1*abs(share of seats in lower house held by Democrats - .5)*abs(share of seats in upper house 
held by democrats - .5). 
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To measure political polarization within a state, we follow Hanssen (2004) in using 
measures of ideology based on roll-call voting in the U.S. Congress, as no comparable data on 
political polarization at the state level exists. The data are taken from Poole and Rosenthal 
(1997). The authors estimate the positions of members of Congress along two dimensions. Like 
Hanssen (2004), we use the first of these, the liberal-conservative axis, to calculate average 
ideology scores for each state’s members of Congress. For each year and state, we measure 
policy distance by the absolute difference between average ideology scores. 
Our key fiscal variables of interest include the deficit and debt, and general revenues, all 
measured in real per capita terms. Socioeconomic controls include real per capita income, 
income squared, population size, population squared, percent elderly, and percent school-aged. 
Finally, we include state fixed effects to capture permanent differences among states and year 
effects to capture common exogenous shocks. Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
Empirical specification 
We want to estimate the effect of political and economic variables on the level of the 
fiscal transparency index. Our basic specification is: 
 'st s t st sty p x stvα γ χ β= + + + +  
where sty is the level of fiscal transparency in state s in year t, sα  is a state fixed effect, tγ  is a 
year indicator variable, stp is the measure of political competition, stx  comprises other political 
and economic variables, and stv  is the error term. When we estimate the model, we allow for 
heteroscedasticity in the error terms and always report F-tests based on robust standard errors. 
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To allow for the fact that institutional changes occur infrequently, we add to the basic 
model two features. First, we include a series of lags for the independent variables, so that even 
when the conditions for change are in place, the dynamics of the political process may delay the 
actual implementation of a new procedure. Specifically, we include lags from t – 2, and t – 4. 
Second, we also include the lagged dependent variable (at t – 4) on the right-hand side. While 
there are well known issues with the fixed-effects estimator in the presence of lagged dependent 
variables, we are reasonably confident that any bias is minimal as the length of the panel spans 
three decades. We also note (following Judson and Owen 1999) that any bias will mostly affect 
the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, which we include as a control, but which is not 
a variable of interest to us. As a robustness check, below we also consider a dynamic panel data 
model estimated by GMM and show that results are unaffected. 
6. Empirical Results 
The first column of Table 2 reviews our hypotheses. As explained in Section 2, we expect 
incumbents to tie the hands of both their potential successors and other politicians with whom 
they contemporaneously share policy-making authority; thus, political competition should be 
associated with increased transparency. We also expect greater increases in transparency under 
Democratic control of government, as Democratic politicians arguably have greater incentives to 
make voters trust them with more resources. Polarization and poor fiscal performance might be 
hindrances or catalysts to increasing fiscal transparency, for reasons explained above.  
The second column of Table 2 summarizes the actual signs of the coefficients on these 
variables in the empirical analysis that follows. A comparison of the first and second column 
shows that the findings are largely consistent with our hypotheses. We now turn to a detailed 
discussion of our results. 
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[Table 2 here] 
We present the results of our quantitative empirical analysis in several tables. Table 3 
reports results from our basic specification, Table 4 restricts the sample to states that experienced 
changes in the level of transparency, Tables 5 and 6 introduces interaction effects between the 
political setting and the fiscal situation, and Table 7 decomposes the transparency index into 
expenditure transparency, revenue transparency, and general transparency. 
The tables report F-test statistics for (groups of) variables and their lags, the 
corresponding p-values, and the sign of the aggregate effect, which is the simple sum of the 
(current and lagged) coefficients on the variable, by a + or – sign. We comment on some 
magnitudes of effects in the text below. We focus on six groups of variables and their lagged 
values, in addition to the lagged endogenous variable: (1) political competition measures; (2) 
political polarization; (3) partisan composition of government; (4) debt; (5) fiscal surplus; and 
(6) fiscal deficit. We also include, but do not report, socioeconomic controls, a dummy variable 
for large deficits (which equals a dummy for Rhode Island in the early 1990s and is positive and 
strongly significant), a dummy variable for independent governors (negative and significant) and 
state and year fixed effects (which are jointly significant, respectively). 
Table 3 reports results from basic specifications on the full data set. The table holds five 
sets of results, one for each of the three measures of political competition, one for party control 
and one for fiscal imbalance. The first column reports the results when we use divided 
government as our measure of political competition. The F-test statistic value of 1.91 is the result 
of the joint test that Σ  for 0kdivgovt = ,  2,  4.k t t t= − −  The test has (1, 1029) degrees of 
freedom and the resulting p-value is 0.167. The sum of the coefficient estimates is positive, 
which implies that the presence of divided government increases the level of fiscal transparency, 
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though only in a marginally significant way. The regression reported in the first column also 
shows that political polarization is associated with lower transparency.15 Jointly, the continuous 
polarization measure and the dummy variable for one-party states have significantly negative 
effects on the degree of transparency.  
[Table 3 here] 
The next pair of columns reports results from similar regressions where the measures of 
political competition are, respectively, legislative competition and gubernatorial turnover. We 
find, across the measures of political competition, broadly similar results, clearest in the case of 
legislative competition. Political competition tends to increase the level of fiscal transparency, 
which supports the idea of strategic or “non-partisan” institutions. In state governments 
characterized by high degrees of turnover or by divided government, incumbent majorities of 
both parties can benefit from increasing transparency as this restricts potential successors from 
the opposing party.  
To sum up, there is evidence that political competition is associated with higher 
transparency while polarization is associated with lower transparency. This could suggest that 
bipartisan cooperation on changing transparency is possible to a lesser extent when parties are 
polarized.  
The fourth column considers party control of government. An implication of Ferejohn’s 
(1999) model, supported empirically by Alt, Lassen, and Skilling (2002), is that higher 
                                                 
15 Recall that a polarization measure is available only for states represented by more than one party in Congress. 
States that elect only one party to Congress will, besides typically having small populations, have some degree of 
polarization and may even be more polarized, everything else equal. For consistency, they are represented in our 
analysis by a dummy variable, since a “zero” score indicates minimal polarization, as well as only one party in 
Congress. 
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transparency is associated with a larger public sector. A possible implication of that finding is 
that parties favoring a larger public sector would have an incentive to increase transparency to 
gain voter support. The Democratic Party is widely recognized as more favorable than the 
Republicans to a larger public sector. Indeed, Democratic control of the governorship and 
legislature is associated with increased transparency. However, neither variable achieves 
statistically significant estimates.  
In addition to the political variables, fiscal variables also appear to matter for the 
adoption of fiscal transparency. Higher levels of debt are associated with lower transparency. 
Elsewhere, there is cross-sectional evidence that lower transparency produces higher debt,16 But 
here the inclusion of fixed effects means that this result is based on time variation. Moreover, 
departures from budget balance are associated with higher transparency. Both higher deficits (the 
deficit is presented as a positive number; see Table 1) and higher surpluses contribute to higher 
transparency. The deficit result has the familiar interpretation that when times are bad, politicians 
need to open up, explain, and justify their actions. The conjunction of debt and deficit results 
suggest that a deficit motivates reform more where the stock of debt is lower, i.e., where the 
deficit more resembles a surprise or “crisis.” The surplus result looks like a confirmation that 
politicians with good fiscal records are more likely to open the books for outsiders to see, but the 
debt result goes against this. We return to these issues below. 
Across all specifications of Table 3, the controls for population, income, and revenues are 
usually insignificant, while the percentage of the population that is elderly (school-aged) has a 
positive (negative) effect on transparency. Table 4 eliminates insignificant controls and reports 
results from a set of regressions including both fiscal variables and significant political variables 
                                                 
16 Alt and Lassen (2006a) show that in a sample of OECD countries lower transparency leads to higher debt. 
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in Table 3. The regressions are repeated for each of the three competition measures, both for the 
full sample and for a restricted sample of states that changed transparency at some point during 
the sample period. This restricted sample excludes states with constant percentage scores as well 
as states where changes in the score reflect the in- or exclusion of particular items rather than 
real changes. The restricted sample includes 38 states. 
[Table 4 here] 
Compared to Table 3, the results for fiscal variables are essentially unchanged: debt has a 
uniformly negative effect, and imbalance a positive effect, on transparency. The political 
competition results are stronger than before. The coefficients on all of the competition measures 
are significantly positive, regardless of measure and sample. The effect of political polarization 
is slightly inconsistent, but usually negative and significant (as above) when the sample is 
restricted to states that actually changed transparency. Polarization aside, the general impression 
is that the causes of fiscal transparency identified above are not identified by cross-state 
comparisons with states that did not change transparency, but rather, since we control for state 
fixed effects, are driven by within-state changes in our explanatory variables. 
How big are the effects of the explanatory variables? Since our specification includes 
contemporaneous and lagged values of explanatory variables and a lagged dependent variable, 
we calculate the magnitudes of effects as follows. Consider the coefficient on legislative 
competition reported in Table 4, column 3. Suppose legislative competition increases by one 
standard deviation (0.05, as shown in Table 1) and sustains this new level forever, or at least long 
enough for the effects of lagged variables to cumulate. The sum of the coefficients is 0.252 and 
the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is 0.558. Then the magnitude of a one-time, one-
standard-deviation, sustained increase of 0.05 in legislative competition is (0.05*0.252)/(1-
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0.558) = 0.0285, with most of the change taking place in the first eight years. That may not seem 
like a big effect, but recall that 0.1 is one extra transparency item in the index, so the magnitude 
of this effect is between one-quarter and one-third of an item. Intriguingly, if we consider the 
impact of a negative fiscal imbalance using the same estimates, the cumulative effect of a 
sustained, one-standard-deviation increase in the deficit is also on the order of 0.03, or about 
three-tenths of a one-item reform. 
Interactions of political and fiscal variables 
In Table 5, we report results from a specification that allows interactions between the 
political and fiscal variables in their effect on transparency. Specifically, we consider the 
interactive effect of one measure of political competition (divided government) and deviations 
from budget balance (absolute deviation or separate measures of surpluses and deficits) on the 
degree of transparency. Essentially, political competition and fiscal imbalance appear to act like 
substitutes. We find that the presence of divided government strongly reduces the positive effects 
of fiscal imbalance on transparency, independent of the sample used. One interpretation of this 
result, to be explored further, is that divided government makes it less likely that, for example, a 
governor can increase transparency under good budget performance to look good to observers. 
Conversely, divided government may limit the ability of a government to provide a prompt 
institutional response to negative fiscal shocks,17 though we note from columns 3 and 4 that the 
substitution effect is less well determined in the case of deficits than surpluses. 
                                                 
17 In fact, what Table 3 shows is that, absent fiscal shocks, the effect of divided government is stronger than it 
appeared in Table 1. This may be because divided government is slow to respond to fiscal shocks (Alt and Lowry 
1994). We will also re-examine the other competition indicators, whose effects were stronger in Table 1, for 
evidence of interactions. 
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[Tables 5 and 6 here] 
Until now, we have classified governments with split legislatures as divided 
governments. Table 6 builds on the two first columns of Table 4, above, but distinguishes “pure” 
divided government, where a governor faces a unified legislature of the opposing party, from 
split legislatures, in which each chamber is controlled by a different party. The results from 
Table 4 remain: debt has a negative effect, imbalance a positive effect, and polarization an 
inconsistent (but negative in the restricted sample) effect on transparency. We see that, 
controlling for the effects of debt, imbalance, and polarization, a Democratic legislature is indeed 
positively associated with transparency. However, it is no more so with a Democratic governor 
than without. The combination of a Democratic legislature, Republican governor, and fiscal 
deficits observed in some of the case studies appears to be generalizeable as a source of 
transparency reform. Similarly, a split legislature is positively associated with transparency and 
seems to account for most of the effect of political competition – the effect is large while the 
pure divided government indicator becomes considerably smaller and less precisely estimated. 
However, the split legislature and fiscal imbalance effects are substitutes, as described above. 
The combined effects of a Democratic legislature and fiscal surpluses are reduced by the 
presence of divided government.  
Components of transparency 
We also consider a decomposition of the transparency index into items related (primarily) 
to expenditures, (primarily) to revenues, and equally to both sides of the budget. The expenditure 
index contains items 2 (multi-year expenditure forecasts), 6 (single appropriations bill), 7 (non-
partisan appropriations bill), 8 (non-open-ended appropriations), and 9 (published performance 
measures). The revenue index contains items 4 (binding revenue forecasts) and 5 (shared revenue 
 26
forecasts), and the general index contains items 1 (GAAP) and 3 (budget cycle frequency). Table 
7 reports the results for the three sub-indexes for each of the three political competition 
measures. 
[Table 7 here] 
Political competition affects different types of transparency in different ways. While all 
three competition measures are associated with higher expenditure transparency, gubernatorial 
turnover is negatively related to revenue transparency and legislative competition likewise 
negatively related to general transparency. Furthermore, the effect of political polarization also 
differs markedly across indexes. While it is weakly related to higher expenditure transparency, 
more polarized states are significantly less likely to have implemented GAAP and have an 
annual budget. Finally, the strong effects of budget imbalances on our main fiscal transparency 
index can be traced to increases in expenditure transparency, while revenue transparency is not 
associated with the fiscal policy setting at all. These preliminary results confirm the intuition of 
Gavazza and Lizzeri (2005) that revenue and expenditure transparency can be conceptually 
different, but the stronger results on expenditure transparency may also partly be attributable to 
the fact that there is more variation in that variable, as it contains five items. 
Robustness considerations18
As a robustness test, we included a variable for the governor’s approval rating, which was 
generally significant and negative, although it also reduced the number of cases. This finding 
suggests once again that the “doing badly, clean up the act” motive for reform is stronger than 
the “doing well, show more” incentive. Note also that insofar as Alt, Lassen, and Skilling (2002) 
                                                 
18 All robustness test results are available from the authors upon request. 
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showed that transparency was good for approval ratings, the fact that we find low approval 
causing transparency is in spite of any endogeneity bias. As a second robustness test, we 
explored the possibility that governors who cannot stand for re-election are less concerned with 
undertaking reforms that yield future benefits. In every specification containing an indicator for a 
“lame duck” governor, we observed a negative (as expected) but insignificant coefficient. The 
relationship between political competition and transparency was also robust to employing a 
variety of alternative revenue definitions and measures. Finally, we found no interaction between 
polarization and divided government. 
We also tried omitting the lagged dependent variable, which had some effect on the 
results, but we believe that including the lagged dependent variable to represent the stickiness of 
transparency is more important than any bias induced in its coefficient. We also examined cross-
sectional effects; the results stand up with two-year averages, but begin to drift when more years 
are averaged. With five-year averages the polarization effect drops out but the competition effect 
usually remains correctly signed and nearly significant, and the split legislature effect remains 
significant. We included a variety of trends and squared trends, and the results remained intact—
perhaps not surprisingly, as the time fixed effects pick up trends anyway. We looked for regional 
trends and diffusion of transparency innovations, but only found these for one item in our index: 
performance measures.  
As a final robustness check, we used an Arellano-Bond (1991) first difference GMM 
estimation, rather than fixed effects, of the main equations.19 Overall, the results are highly 
                                                 
19 The estimation was carried out using Stata's xtabond2 procedure (Roodman, 2003) with the noleveleq option.  
There was no sign of overidentification or second-order autocorrelation in the first-differences. For computational 
reasons, the instrument matrix was constructed using xtabond2's collapse option, which drastically reduces the 
dimension of the instrument matrix, which becomes large in Arellano-Bond estimation of long panels. In long 
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consistent with the earlier findings. As in Table 4, political competition in the forms of divided 
government and legislative competition is again associated with a higher degree of transparency, 
while gubernatorial competition does not seem to affect transparency. Fiscal surplus continues to 
be associated with higher transparency. In contrast to the previous results, political polarization 
does not appear to significantly affect transparency in the GMM estimation, although the signs 
are the same as before. Real per capita debt remains significantly negatively associated with 
fiscal transparency, but a Democratic-controlled state legislature is now significantly associated 
with a higher degree of transparency. In comparison to the results in Table 6, divided 
government remains positive and becomes marginally significant while polarization retains its 
sign but becomes insignificant. One interaction becomes stronger, one becomes weaker.  
Virtually nothing now depends on whether we include all cases or only states that experienced 
changes in transparency.20
7. Conclusions and implications  
This paper has tried to disentangle the causal effects of political and fiscal factors on 
transparency. The results of our empirical specifications, including long lags of the independent 
variables and lagged values of the transparency variables, together with the findings of the case 
studies, suggest that both politics and fiscal outcomes affect the level of transparency. Political 
competition tends to increase the level of fiscal transparency; this result holds up across different 
definitions, specifications, and estimation methods. Fiscal imbalance, in the form of higher 
                                                                                                                                                             
panels, the collapse correction reduces efficiency, which implies that the reported standard errors are conservative, 
but at the same time counters problems with bias arising from the number of instruments approaching the number of 
observations. 
20 We also experimented with a random effects Tobit model, with no qualitative effect on the results. 
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surpluses or deficits, also appears to contribute to higher transparency. That relationship is a little 
less robust in the quantitative analysis than in the case studies, which were designed to examine 
“big” cases of reform. 
While these results are intriguing, there is still more work to do. One concern is that since 
transparency trends upward in our sample period, some of the apparent causes could actually be 
spurious consequences of other trending series, in spite of our inclusion of time fixed effects. 
Future work will examine whether in the short run, an increase in polarization could produce 
divided government and thus also produce transparency, while in the long run more transparency 
is associated with less polarization. Finally, we have collected a panel on cable television 
penetration in order to estimate the relationship between demand for transparency and media 
consumption. In this way we hope to distinguish the effects of access to information from those 
of quantity, justification, and verifiability.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
 
                    Number of                   Standard 
Variable                          Observations  Mean        Deviation      Minimum      Maximum 
 
 
Transparency score    1152 0.46 0.19 0 1 
Divided government          1128     0.54     0.50        0    1 
Legislative competition         1128    -0.04     0.05               -0.25 0 
Gubernatorial competition    1152    -49.31     11.74             -98.5        0.5 
Polarization          1152     0.48 0.30           0          1.17 
One-party state          1152     0.23     0.42           0              1 
Democratic governor     1152     0.56     0.50           0               1 
Independent governor    1152 0.01     0.10           0           1 
Democratic legislature          1152     0.57     0.50           0       1 
Per capita debt          1152     4047.49     1536.98    950.21 9376.47 
Per capita surplus          1152     58.91     81.78           0  734.20 
Per capita deficit    1152     13.55     32.27           0    344.12 
Per capita budget imbalance 1152 72.46 78.30 0.003 734.20 
Per capita general revenues   1152      1573.65     405.39    825.57 3283.30 
Per capita income          1152     23168.48     4060.33    14615.39     40594.95 
Population (millions)          1152     5.07     5.31        0.40   33.50 
Percent school-aged          1152     19.87     2.20     7.07   26.87 
Percent elderly          1152     12.14     1.90     7.46   18.77 
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Table 2: Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
  
Dependent variable: Transparency score = index value / # available indicators 
       
  Expected sign  Actual sign   
          
       
     Political competition      
          Divided government +  +   
          Legislative competition +  +   
          Gubernatorial competition +  +   
       
     Political polarization ?  +/-   
       
     Partisan composition of government      
          Democratic governor +  +   
          Democratic legislature +  +   
       
     Economic conditions       
          Debt ?  -   
          Surplus ?  +   
          Deficit ?  +   
       
  
? indicates two hypotheses working in opposite directions. 
+/- indicates that the sign is sensitive to the regression specification. 
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Table 3: The Causes of Fiscal Transparency 
  
Dependent variable: Transparency score = index value / # available indicators 
                    
  Political competition measure:        
                   
    Divided   Legislative   Gubernatorial    Party   Fiscal 
    government     competition     competition     Variables     Variables 
                   
t-test: Lagged dependent + 14.54  + 14.73  + 14.62   + 14.99  + 14.32 
  variable, 4 years (p-value)   (.000)   (.000)   (.000)    (.000)   (.000) 
                   
F-test: current and lagged 
political  + 1.91  + 6.77  + 1.1         
  competition (p-value)   (.167)   (.009)   (.295)         
                   
F-test: current and lagged 
political  - 3.02  - 4.04  - 3.45         
  polarization (p-value)   (.049)   (.018)   (.032)         
                   
F-test: current and lagged             + 0.88     
  Democratic governor (p-
value)             (.349)     
                   
F-test: current and lagged             + 2.56     
  Democratic legislature (p-
value)             (.110)     
                   
F-test: current and lagged 
fiscal debt               - 5.93 
  (p-value)                (.015) 
                   
F-test: current and lagged 
fiscal                + 16.31 
  surplus (p-value)                (.000) 
                   
F-test: current and lagged 
fiscal                + 7.7 
  Deficit (p-value)                (.006) 
                   
Number of observations   1127     1127     1152     1152     1152 
Years   1976-98     1976-98     1976-98     1976-98     1976-98 
Note: All regressions include further controls not shown: per capita revenues, per cent elderly, per cent school-aged, income, income 
squared,  
population, population squared, a constant term, state fixed effects, and year indicators. Calculations based on robust standard errors. 
Divided government includes split legislatures. 
+/- denotes the sign of the coefficient or, in the case of lagged variables, the sign of the sum of all coefficients. 
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 Table 4: The Causes of Fiscal Transparency: Full Model 
  
Dependent variable: Transparency score = index value / # available indicators 
              
Political competition measure: Divided government  Legislative competition  
Gubernatorial 
competition 
                          
                
t-test: Lagged dependent + 13.58 + 11.59  + 14.03 + 12.07  + 13.76 + 11.79 
  variable, 4 years (p-value)  (.000)  (.000)   (.000)  (.000)   (.000)  (.000) 
               
F-test: current and lagged political  + 4.08 + 3.48  + 9.68 + 6.02  + 3.85 + 5.04 
  competition (p-value)  (.043)  (.062)   (.001)  (.014)   (.050)  (.020) 
               
F-test: current and lagged political  + 6.70 - 1.98  - 8.16 - 3.14  + 7.70 - 2.83 
  polarization (p-value)  (.001)  (.139)   (.000)  (.044)   (.000)  (.060) 
               
F-test: current and lagged  + 0.45 + 0.27  + 0.36 + 0.25  + 2.49 + 2.66 
  Democratic governor (p-value)  (.501)  (.601)   (.548)  (.615)   (.115)  (.103) 
               
F-test: current and lagged  + 2.23 + 1.83  + 1.81 + 1.87  + 1.75 + 1.89 
  Democratic legislature (p-value)  (.135)  (.177)   (.179)  (.172)   (.186)  (.170) 
               
F-test: current and lagged fiscal debt - 7.90 - 9.09  - 3.66 - 4.53  - 8.74 - 8.29 
  (p-value)  (.005)  (.003)   (.056)  (.034)   (.003)  (.004) 
               
F-test: current and lagged fiscal  + 19.22 + 18.59  + 16.98 + 16.57  + 19.45 + 19.62 
  surplus (p-value)  (.000)  (.000)   (.000)  (.000)   (.000)  (.000) 
               
F-test: current and lagged fiscal  + 18.21 + 16.32  + 15.82 + 15.32  + 18.60 + 18.45 
  deficit (p-value)  (.000)  (.000)   (.000)  (.000)   (.000)  (.000) 
                
Number of observations   1127   912     1127   912     1152   936 
Years   
1976-
98   
1976-
98     
1976-
98   
1976-
98     
1976-
98   
1976-
98 
All regressions include a control for per cent elderly, a constant term, state fixed effects, and year indicators.  
Calculations based on robust standard errors. 
Divided government includes split legislatures. 
+/- denotes the sign of the coefficient or, in the case of lagged variables, the sign of the sum of all coefficients. 
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 Table 5: The Causes of Fiscal Transparency: Interactive Effects 
            
Dependent variable: Transparency score = index value / # available indicators 
            
Political competition measure: Divided government  
                      
            
t-test: Lagged dependent + 13.61 + 11.40  + 13.56 + 11.36  
  variable, 4 years (p-value)  (.000)  (.000)   (.000)  (.000)  
           
F-test: current and lagged political  + 18.92 + 19.38  + 16.85 + 16.11  
  competition (p-value)  (.000)  (0.000)   (.000)  (.000)  
           
F-test: current and lagged political  + 5.66 + 1.14  + 6.06 + 1.45  
  polarization (p-value)  (.004)  (.320)   (.002)  (.235)  
           
F-test: current and lagged  + 0.50 + 0.27  + 0.53 + 0.32  
  Democratic governor (p-value)  (.482)  (.601)   (.466)  (.570)  
           
F-test: current and lagged  + 1.06 + 0.49  + 1.25 + 0.67  
  Democratic legislature (p-value)  (.304)  (.177)   (.264)  (.414)  
           
F-test: current and lagged fiscal debt - 7.44 - 9.59  - 7.63 - 9.57  
  (p-value)  (.007)  (.002)   (.006)  (.002)  
           
F-test: current and lagged fiscal  + 41.16 + 41.31       
  Imbalance (p-value)  (.000)  (.000)       
           
F-test: current and lagged fiscal  - 16.51 - 18.69       
  Imbalance * pol. competition  (p-value)  (.000)  (.000)       
           
F-test: current and lagged fiscal       + 35.42 + 37.39  
  surplus (p-value)       (.000)  (.000)  
           
F-test: current and lagged fiscal       - 15.24 - 17.65  
  surplus * pol. competition  (p-value)       (.000)  (.000)  
           
F-test: current and lagged fiscal       + 18.72 + 13.72  
  deficit (p-value)       (.000)  (.000)  
           
F-test: current and lagged fiscal       - 2.91 - 1.91  
  deficit * pol. competition  (p-value)       (.089)  (.167)  
            
Number of observations   1127   912     1127   912   
Years   1976-98   1976-98     1976-98   1976-98   
All regressions include a control for per cent elderly, a constant term, state fixed effects, and year indicators.  
Calculations based on robust standard errors. 
Divided government includes split legislatures. 
+/- denotes the sign of the coefficient or, in the case of lagged variables, the sign of the sum of all coefficients. 
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Table 6: The Causes of Fiscal Transparency: Interactive Effects  
   
Dependent variable: Transparency score = index value / # available indicators  
        
 Party variables   
             
        
t-test: Lagged dependent + 14.15 + 12.25   
  variable, 4 years (p-value)  (.000)  (.000)   
       
F-test: current and lagged political  + 5.84 - 3.52   
  polarization (p-value)  (.003)  (.030)   
       
F-test: current and lagged  - 0.39 - 0.81   
  Democratic governor (p-value)  (.531)  (.368)   
       
F-test: current and lagged  + 14.89 + 16.69   
  Democratic legislature (p-value)  (.000)  (.000)   
       
F-test: current and lagged fiscal debt - 5.87 - 4.20   
  (p-value)  (.016)  (.041)   
       
F-test: current and lagged  + 1.34 + 0.37   
  divided government  (p-value)  (.247)  (.545)   
       
F-test: current and lagged  + 36.81 + 43.32   
  split legislature (p-value)  (.000)  (.000)   
       
F-test: current and lagged fiscal  + 36.34 + 35.47   
  surplus (p-value)  (.000)  (.000)   
       
F-test: current and lagged fiscal  - 9.57 - 11.57   
  surplus * divided govt  (p-value)  (.002)  (.000)   
       
F-test: current and lagged fiscal  - 15.20 - 17.79   
  surplus * split legislature  (p-value)  (.000)  (.000)   
       
F-test: current and lagged fiscal  + 20.66 + 15.82   
  deficit (p-value)  (.000)  (.000)   
       
F-test: current and lagged fiscal  - 0.09 + 0.08   
  deficit * divided govt  (p-value)  (.770)  (.781)   
       
F-test: current and lagged fiscal  - 4.45 - 3.48   
  deficit * split legislature  (p-value)  (.035)  (.062)   
        
Number of observations   1152   936     
Years   1976-98   1976-98     
All regressions include a control for per cent elderly, a constant term, state fixed effects, and year indicators.  
Calculations based on robust standard errors. 
Divided government excludes split legislatures. 
+/- denotes the sign of the coefficient or, in the case of lagged variables, the sign of the sum of all 
coefficients. 
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Table 7: The Causes of Expenditure, Revenue and General Transparency 
          
        Expenditure transparency   Revenue transparency   General fiscal transparency 
                      
Political competition 
measure  Div gov  Leg comp  
Gub 
comp  Div gov Leg comp Gub comp  Div gov Leg comp Gub comp 
                              
 
          
                       
t-test: Lagged dependent  + 7.97 + 8.16 + 7.67   
    
     
   
    
     
   
    
        
             
             
             
                 
                 
            
                 
                 
          
+ 5.65 + 6.01 + 5.61  + 12.02 + 11.72 + 11.80 
  variable, 4 years (p-
value) 
 
  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)
 
 (.000)  (.000)  (.000)
 
 (.000)  (.000)  (.000) 
                
F-test: current and lagged 
political  + 1.76 + 2.07 + 4.11 + 3.05 + 2.30 - 2.06  + 4.25 - 1.74 + 1.67 
  competition (p-value) 
  
   (.153)  (.103)  (.007)
 
 (.028)  (.076)  (.104)  (.006)  (.158)  (.172) 
                
F-test: current and lagged 
political  + 1.53 + 1.65 + 1.40 +/- 1.03 +/- 1.29 + 1.10  - 4.31 - 3.46 - 3.50 
  polarization (p-value) 
  
   (.166) 
 
 (.130) 
  
 (.212)
 
 (.406)  (.257)  (.359)  (.000) 
 
 (.002) 
 
 (.002) 
        
F-test: current and lagged fiscal 
debt 3.27 2.97  3.36  1.21 1.22  1.19  2.50 2.99  2.98 
  (p-value) 
 
   (.001)
 
(.002)
 
 (.001)
 
 (.288) (.277)  (.300)  (.008)
 
(.002)
 
 (.002) 
     
F-test: current and lagged 
fiscal   + 10.52 + 10.35 + 11.53 + 0.15 + 0.16 + 0.15 - 0.71 - 0.72 - 0.69
  surplus (p-value) 
  
   (.000)
 
(.000)
 
(.000)
 
 (.928) (.923) (.933)  (.546)
 
(.542)
 
(.556)
     
F-test: current and lagged 
fiscal   + 9.05 + 8.85 + 8.92 - 0.52 - 0.49 - 0.50 - 1.91 - 1.44 - 1.61
  deficit (p-value) 
  
   (.000)
 
(.000)
 
(.000)
 
 
 
(.672)
 
(.688)
 
(.685)
 
 (.313)
 
(.229)
 
(.185)
   
number of observations     865   865   865     865   865   865     865   865   865 
Years         
1976-
98           
                        
 
1976-
98 
1976-
98     
1976-
98   1976-98   1976-98     
1976-
98
1976-
98 1976-98
All regressions include a control for per cent elderly, a constant term, state fixed effects, and year indicators. Calculations based on      
robust standard errors. Divided government includes split legislatures.            
+/- denotes the sign of the coefficient or, in the case of lagged variables, the sign of the sum of all coefficients.     
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Figure 1 
Figure 2: Fiscal Transparency in the American States: 1972-2002 
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